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THE EMPTY CIRCLES OF LIBERAL 
JUSTmCATION 
Pierre Schlag* 
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk 
about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives 
them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is 
not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact. ... In pass­
ing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the 
complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it 
does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is im­
mediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions 
because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the 
evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean some­
thing by themselves. 
- Roland Barthesl 
American liberal thinkers are fascinated with the justification of 
the liberal state. It is this question of justification that inspires and 
organizes the work of such leading liberal thinkers as John Rawls, 
Ronald Dworkin, Frank Michelman, and Bruce Ackerman.2 
The manifest import and prevalence of the question of justifica­
tion among liberal thinkers makes it possible to speak here of a 
certain "practice of liberal justification." This practice displays a 
certain order and certain recursive characteristics. It is composed 
of a common ontology and a common narrative. It poses for itself a 
series of recursive intellectual problems answered with a stock set 
of rhetorical moves, aimed at achieving certain key political 
objectives. 
Here I wish to explore the character and identity of this practice 
of liberal justification. What sort of world does it offer us? And 
how does it do its work? 
The inquiry is thus twofold. In one aspect, the aim is to reveal 
the practice of liberal justification - to reveal its organizing charac­
ter, its pathways, and its problems. In another aspect, the effort 
* Pierre Schlag, Byron White Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado 
School of Law. B.A. 1975, Yale; J.D. 1978, UCLA. - Ed. 
1. ROLAND BARnras, MYTHOLOGIES 143 (Annette Lavers trans., Hill & Wang 1972) 
(1957). 
2. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE - FOUNDATIONS (1991); RONALD 
DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); JoHN RAWLS, PounCAL LIBERALISM (1993); JoHN RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Fore­
word: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986). 
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here is to try to understand this practice - to appreciate why and 
how it comes to have the distinctive identity and character it does. 
Here, we will encounter a
· 
number of familiar leading liberal 
thinkers and philosophers. We will not, however, encounter them 
in the usual way. We will not attempt to join or to participate in the 
practice of liberal justification. Hence, we will not pay much atten­
tion to the intricate differences and disagreements that characterize 
the various attempts at liberal justification. On the contrary, be­
cause it is the practice of liberal justification as a whole that we seek 
to reveal, this inquiry will focus on the broad - sometimes loose -
commonalities that sustain the intricate differences and disagree­
ments, the broad-scale frames and orientations within which liberal 
thinkers strive to set out and to resolve their problems. 
Thus, the inquiry itself will deliberately fail to honor some of the 
received categories and operations of Anglo-American analytical 
philosophy. For one thing, the categories and operations of Anglo­
American analytical philosophy are not helpful to the enterprise 
pursued here. For another, those categories and operations are, as 
a general matter, less an aid to explanation than they are in need of 
explanation themselves. . 
We will also elide what are, for some �ther purposes, significant 
differences in the objects and missions of the liberal versions of 
political philosophy (Rawls), legal philosophy (H.L.A. Hart), con­
stitutional theory (Ackerman and Michelman), theories of adjudi­
cation (Dworkin), and theories of interpretation (Owen Fiss). 
The point of this elision is most definitely not to suggest that 
these various enterprises are all the same. Rather the elision here 
enables a demonstration that the same aesthetic, the same ontologi­
cal and narrative forms traverse these different liberal versions of 
politics, legalism, constitutionalism, adjudication, and interpreta­
tion. Here, as in other contexts, form not only anticipates sub­
stance; but, in important ways, the form is the substance. 3 
3. The practices of normative legal thought and Langdellianism institute, rehearse, and 
entrench an aesthetic of self, social life, political engagement, and the like. See Pierre Schlag, 
"Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruc­
tion, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 1631 (1990) (hereinafter Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte'1; Pierre 
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991); Pierre Schlag, 
The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 1627 {1991). 
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THE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGY - ONTOLOGICAL 
IDENTITIES AND NARRATIVES 
In America, much of the practice of liberal justification is 
shaped by, and organized around, the aspirations and problems of a 
popular constitutional mythology. This conflation of liberalism 
with constitutionalism is hardly surprising. For one thing, the 
American constitutional mythology was itself very much influenced 
by liberal thought as expounded by Montesquieu and Locke.4 For 
another, contemporary American liberal thinkers are very much 
oriented to the practical task of justifying and defending what they 
see as an extant (and almost perfected) liberal state - namely, 
their own.5 
The popular narrative recounts the story of a sovereign people 
who in a foundational moment established their own state by set­
ting forth in a written constitution the powers and limitations of 
their government. The very identity, content, and character of this 
government is established by the Constitution itself. In tum, the 
authority of this Constitution stems from the consent of the gov­
erned - their acquiescence in a limited surrender of their sover­
eign power in return for the benefits of a limited, representative 
government. 
This narrative ostensibly establishes the authority of the Consti­
tution, justifies that authority through reason, and achieves both 
tasks in a such a way as to demonstrate the consent of the governed 
to constitutional rule. The achievement of these tasks effectively 
requires a narrative that reconcij.es reason with authority, authority 
with freedom, and freedom with reason. The attempts to achieve 
such a reconciliation confront a series of recurrent liberal conun­
drums that themselves give shape to the drama of liberal 
justification. 
This constitutional narrative, as expressed in both the popular 
constitutional mythology and in the more intellectualized efforts at 
liberal justification, revolves around certain key ontological 
identities: 
"The Constitution" 
"The Founding" 
4. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (David Wallace Carrithers ed. 
& Thomas Nugent trans., University of Cal. Press 1977) (1748). 
5. As but one instance among many, the very influential work of John Rawls conflates 
questions about fundamental constitutional principles with the basic organization of the 
state. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERAUSM, supra note 2, at 227-28. 
4 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1 
"The People" 
"The Consent of the People" 
These key identities comprise a constitutional ontology: they are 
the fundamental and enduring "beings" of the constitutional narra­
tive and feature repeatedly in the drama of popular constitutional 
mythology. 
To be sure, the precise character of these identities can vary 
somewhat. Indeed, it is precisely this genial flexibility that enables 
these crucial identities to work as mythic referents. Yet, even as 
their character and content may be "reconstructed," they endure as 
the origins, boundaries, structures, and levers through which the 
normative constructions of American liberal justification take place 
- over and over again. American political-legal imagination is for­
ever circling around and returning to these crucial ontological iden­
tities. Consider then a brief description of these identities. 
The Constitution is, in American popular and legal culture, an 
authoritative paramount norm - hierarchically superior to any 
other legal or political authority, save perhaps one (soon to be men­
tioned). The Constitution is held to be the ultimate authority -
the frame of reference of last resort. All political and legal acts 
must ultimately conform to this authoritative source. It is a mark of 
the authoritative character of this source that it is invoked in all 
manner of ways - as icon, symbol, plan, rule, argument, text, spirit 
- to perform a variety of actions - constitute, organize, control, 
regulate, inspire, justify. It is a measure of the paramount character 
of this authoritative source that very often it is taken to be the final 
word, the ultimate frame of reference, the last recourse, the very 
limit of possible political-legal contestation.6 
The foundational moment is an aspect of the politics of time. In 
American popular culture, the founding in 1787 has special signifi­
cance. While the point would seldom be expressed this way, the 
foundational moment is a breach in time. It is an origin that signals 
a discontinuity between all that has happened before and all that 
will happen after that moment. With respect to what happened 
before, the foundational moment acts as a rupture. Prior history, 
prior practices, prior beliefs lose their intrinsic authority. Whatever 
authority they retain after 1787- and in some cases it is considera­
ble - stems from the fact that they are explicitly or tacitly incorpo­
rated by the Constitution at the moment of foundation. Certain 
6. Indeed, among lay people, arguments that the constitution requires thus and such are 
often taken to be definitive invocations of the final authority. 
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formulae and devices are explicitly used to refer back to the pre­
Constitutional age. Hence, for instance, the liberty of the Due Pro­
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is said to refer to the 
liberties recognized historically by "the collective conscience of our 
people. "7 This formula and others like it serve as a bridge between 
the meaning of the Constitution and antecedent beliefs and tradi­
tions. But even so, this renvoi confirms the originating and self­
constituting character of the foundational moment. 
The People also occupy a special place in the popular American 
constitutional mythology. From the high school civics classroom to 
the most intellectualized law school seminar, the People is held to 
be sovereign. The Constitution - and thus the powers of govern­
ment - is held to stem from the People. The People are a mythic 
subject, a mythic agency. The precise identity of the People re­
mains largely undetermined. In part that is because since 1787, we 
have not heard a whole lot from "The People" - there has been no 
widespread recognition of any action by the People.8 The popular 
view that the Constitution at once stems from the People and yet is 
the final, paramount authority creates the potential for a certain 
undecidability in the hierarchy of the liberal state. Is it the Consti­
tution that is paramount or the People? 
Consent is a fourth identity crucial to the liberal constitutional 
narrative. The legitimacy of the paramount norm, of the Constitu­
tion, depends upon the consent of the People. It is the historical or 
mythic fact of consent to limited government that produces the le­
gitimacy of the liberal state and its actions. Consent works both in 
a positive and in a negative sense. In a positive sense, consent 
means that there is a fundamental identification between the Peo­
ple and the State such that the actions of the State become the ac­
tions of the People. The question of political legitimacy is 
seemingly resolved as the opposition between the People and the 
State disappears. In a negative sense, consent functions to disable 
the People from objecting to the actions of their government. The 
government becomes an agent of the People, and so long as the 
agent acts in accordance with the directions of the principal, there 
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("In de­
termining which rights are fundamental, judges . . .  must look to the 'traditions and [collec­
tive] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] . .. as to 
be ranked as fundamental.' " (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))). 
8. Any number of political actions - from the ratification of the Civil War Amendments, 
to popular protests such as those during the Vietnam war, to the routine voting on state 
referenda and initiatives - might well be considered actions of "The People.'  But the fact is 
that they have not been considered actions of the People on any significant scale. 
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are no grounds for complaint. Either way, positively or negatively, 
consent operates to produce a mythic belief in self-rule. 
CRUCIAL QUESTIONS 
This deeply ingrained set of identities, and the constitutional 
narrative they enable, exhibit a certain aesthetic - one that is repli­
cated in more intellectualized efforts at liberal justification. Indeed, 
one can consider the intellectualized efforts at liberal justification as 
attempts to rework the popular constitutional mythology in ways 
that strive to avoid some of its intellectual shortcomings. These 
shortcomings are in part linked to the exigent demand for a justifi­
cation of the liberal state as a form of self-government. 
The representation of the liberal state as a form of self-rule 
means that the liberal state must somehow be accepted, ratified, or 
consented to by those who are ruled. This logic of self-rule and 
self-government is exceedingly demanding. Accordingly, as a form 
of justification, popular constitutional mythology confronts a 
number of familiar problems. Why, for instance, should a constitu­
tion adopted more than two centuries ago in the pre-industrial age 
bind generations living in postindustrial conditions? Why should 
subsequent generations honor the actions and political determina­
tions of the generation of 1787? And in what way does past consent 
to constitutional government suffice to establish consent in the 
present? 
These questions are closely related. Perhaps they are even dif­
ferent ways of asking the same question. If so, the question is 
somewhat nebulous: it is not always clear what the problem is. In 
one sense, one might say that the problem is one of authority. What 
is it that endows a peculiar generation - the generation of 1787 -
with the authority to prescribe the limits and channels of political 
possibility for subsequent others? But one could also frame the 
problem as one of reason. What reason is there to follow the 
proclivities, fears, and hopes of a pre-industrial generation in the 
context of a technological postindustrial society? Why is this con­
stant reference to an unruly and scatter-shot array of documents 
from the past a reasoned way of fashioning the politics and the law 
of the present? So too, the problem might be framed as one of 
freedom. What precisely allows some to delimit the freedom of 
others when these others have not been consulted? In what sense is 
their freedom honored and observed? 
To frame these questions in the idioms of authority, reason, and 
freedom seems quite natural. That is because liberalism itself de-
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mands observance of these three requirements. Indeed, it is the 
hallmark of liberalism to seek reconciliation of authority, reason, 
and freedom in terms that are consonant with each.9 
The popular mythology promises to reconcile these three re­
quirements by reference to the idea of self-government. The popu­
lar mythology, of course, only works to the extent that individuals 
understand themselves within the terms set forth in the myth. Once 
intellectual, social, or political doubt discredits the myth, it becomes 
the task of liberal justification to refashion the crucial ontological 
identities and their relations in a refurbished narrative. Liberal jus­
tification devotes itself to reconstructing the myth so that it 
achieves credibility once more, even to the more discerning and 
critical of subjects - namely, the political losers and the skeptical 
intelligentsia. 
Liberal justification thus attempts to produce an identification 
between the rulers and the ruled. But this cannot be just any identi­
fication. It must be a liberal identification - an identification that 
itself comports with liberal precepts - one that can be achieved 
through liberal reason, while respecting the freedom of the liberal 
individual subject, and yet emerging at the end as nonetheless 
authoritative. 
LIBERAL CONUNDRUMS 
Achieving a liberal identification between the rulers and the 
ruled is surely no easy task. There are many ways in which even the 
best liberal efforts can go wrong. 
Why, for instance, should a reasoning subject consider the Con­
stitution to be authoritative? To ask this question is to ask for the 
justification of authority. Already this produces a quandary. For 
one thing, to ask for a justification in support of an authority can 
already displace the authoritative status of the authority. As 
:Kierkegaard observed: 
To ask if Christ is profound is a blasphemy and an attempt to destroy 
him with ruse (either with consciousness or unconsciously) since the 
question contains doubt concerning his authority .... To ask if a king 
is a genius - for him to be obeyed in the case of a positive answer -
is actually a lese-majeste since the question contains the doubt in the 
sense of submission to his authority.10 
9. See generally GERAID F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LmERALISM: AN EssAY ON EPISTE­
MOLOGY AND POUI1CAL THEORY (1996). 
10. Soren Kierkegaard, "The Notion of the Chosen One," quoted in SLAVOJ ZIZEK, Fa� 
THEY KNow NoT WHAT THEY Do: ENJOYMENT AS A P0Lr11CAL FACTOR 236 (1991). 
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The request for a justification to support an authority is already a 
demotion of the authority in question; it is already an acknowledge­
ment that the authority is in need of further support. It is an ac­
knowledgement that an authority is authoritative only so long as it 
is consonant with a higher order justification. 
To ask for a justification of authority thus already bespeaks a 
loss of authority. In certain political regimes of a theocratic or au­
tocratic character, the justification of authority is a question that 
need not arise. In theocratic political thought, God is His own 
raison d'etre and is not in need of any further justification. In lib­
eral thought, however, the conundrum of reason and authority must 
be confronted. For it is an aspect of liberalism itself that it cannot 
abide dogma, but must show that its authority is justified. 
To simply assert that the Constitution is authoritative and in 
need of no justification will not do.11 On the contrary, the Constitu­
tion must always be justified as an authority that can be made to 
answer in the court of reason. This, of course, is an extremely diffi­
cult task. Indeed, the rhetoric of reason and the rhetoric of author­
ity are hardly congruent. Reason demands argument and 
justification. Authority demands submission and obeisance. The 
irony is that there is an inverse relation between the reasoned char­
acter of justification and the authoritative character of authority. 
The more one insists on a justification of authority, the less authori­
tative authority will be. Whatever power authority has will stem 
not from its authoritative status, but rather from the strength of the 
justification that supports it. Correspondingly, the more one insists 
on the authoritative character of a justification, the less reasoned it 
will be. This is a point to which we shall return. 
In liberal thought, it is not just authority and reason that must 
be reconciled, but each of them must in tum be reconciled with 
freedom. The Constitution must be the product of reason and it 
must be authoritative. But, according to the popular mythology, it 
must also be the kind of reasoned authority to which the governed 
freely consent. 
Authority and freedom may perhaps be compatible, but not ob­
viously so. A political authority that one freely chooses, to which 
one freely submits, is, of course, not much of a political authority. 
It lacks certain crucial aspects of political authority - including the 
power to command from out of its own identity the submission of 
11. Sometimes, however, it is asserted that the question of justification is a matter of 
philosophy not law. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
R.E.v. 353, 383-84 (1981). 
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those subject to authority. An authority that can be freely accepted 
or rejected does not have much in the way of authoritative force. In 
a word, it is hardly compelling. Correspondingly, the more power 
an authority has to command the submission of its subjects, the less 
they will be free in choosing to submit to this authority. 
Reason and freedom are also in tension. Reason - at least 
within the liberal vision - has its own requirements and its own 
procedures that demand observance regardless of whether a subject 
accepts reason in substance. Reason demands that the addressee 
become a certain kind of person - a reasonable one - that ac­
cedes to all reasoned arguments. Reason, for good or ill, demands 
at the outset that one take a certain attitude and orientation to­
wards deliberation and decisionmaking. This point is familiar to all 
who have seen parents reasoning with their child or philosophy 
professors reasoning with their students. The first demand is always 
that the addressee become a subject who listens and reasons. One 
need not be an aficionado of Nietzsche or Foucault to recognize 
that in this demand there may be a restriction of freedom, a reduc­
tion of the possibilities of the subject. To be sure, one can answer in 
a Kantian vein that only the subject capable of reasoning is truly 
capable of freedom. But this answer begs the question, for it 
presumes that in reason's demand that the individual subject submit 
to reason there is no freedom lost. Whether there is - as a Nietz­
sche or a Foucault might claim - or there is not - as a Kant would 
maintain - is precisely the question. 
These are rather exigent demands. Reason, authority, and free­
dom must be reconciled with each other so as to induce the con­
sumers of the liberal myth to embrace the proffered justification as 
an articulation of their own beliefs. The drive in each case is to 
persuade the consumers of the liberal myth that, informed by rea­
son, they freely choose an authoritative, constitutional liberal state. 
One way of achieving this objective is simply to relax liberalism 
- to soften the intellectual medium or the intellectual milieu 
within which the work of liberal justification is performed. Another 
way is to rework the fundamental ontologies and narratives. Lib­
eral thinkers, as a group, do both. 
RELAXING LIBERALISM 
One of the ways in which liberal thinkers facilitate their task of 
justification lies in the use of accommodating metaphors to describe 
and enable their reconciliation of reason, authority, and freedom. 
Hence, for example, the popularity among liberal intellectuals of 
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such fashionable terms as "reconstructing," "reconstituting," "re­
thinking," or "re-"virtually anything. 
The "re" allows liberal thinkers the latitude to represent the 
productions of liberal justification as at once the same and yet dif­
ferent from the original. The liberal production is the same in that 
the authority, the institutions, and the practices of the "original" 
popular mythology remain intact. The liberal production is differ­
ent in that the intellectual embarrassments of the original popular 
mythology are repaired, excised, exorcised, or redeemed by the 
"higher order" liberal justification. It is the genial ambiguity of 
terms like "reconstruction" that at once obscures and enables the 
coexistence of sameness and difference. Another contemporary 
metaphor - equally accommodating - is the trope of "transla­
tion. "12 Translation implies the bringing of an original into a new 
context such that the original is at once the same - as original as 
the original can be given the new context - and yet different - no 
longer as original as the original. Ultimately, these generous meta­
phors authorize liberal intellectuals to establish a parallel universe. 
A PARALLEL UNIVERSE 
In terms of resolving the conundrums posed by the conjunction 
of reason, authority, and freedom, the rhetorical strategy of liberal 
justification is almost always the same. As we shall see, the tensions 
between the three terms - reason, authority, and freedom - dissi­
pate as the identities of the three terms are refashioned such that 
they are consonant and harmonious. 
Thus, thinkers like Rawls, Ackerman, Michelman, and other 
leading American liberal thinkers attempt to refashion the constitu­
tional mythology so as to avoid its inadequacies, but to do so in a 
way that nonetheless continues to resonate with the popular consti­
tutional ontology and the popular constitutional narrative. Those 
who are engaged in the enterprise of liberal justification seek an 
understanding that will be different enough to be intellectually re­
spectable but sufficiently the same so as to reinforce - rather than 
supplant - the popular constitutional mythology. 
Here the hermeneutically generous metaphors, such as recon­
struction, reconstitution, translation, and so on, serve to enable lib­
eral thinkers to abstract, dehistoricize, decontextualize, and 
detemporalize the popular constitutional mythology. This abstrac-
12. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1368-76 
(1997); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1165 {1993). 
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tion, dehistoricization, decontextualization, and detemporalization 
is visited upon any or all of the key ontological identities: 
The Constitution 
The Founding 
The People 
Their Consent 
Liberal justification thus attempts to refurbish the popular constitu­
tional mythology by rendering the key ontological identities and 
narratives more capacious and appealing than the historical 
originals. 
REMODELING THE CONSTITUTION 
In place of the Constitution, liberal justification substitutes a 
more malleable and more capacious paramount norm. The para­
mount norm is an abstracted and decontextualized version of the 
Constitution itself. In Rawls, for instance, the paramount norm 
takes the form of two highly abstract principles of justice: an injunc­
tion to (1) maximize the total system of liberty, and (2) arrange 
inequalities in wealth and other such "primary goods" so that the 
arrangement redounds to the advantage of the least well off.13 In 
Ackerman's work, the paramount norm is cast as instances of 
"higher lawmaking."14 In Dworkin's work, the paramount norm 
consists of the best theory that best fits the institutional materials.15 
In Hart, following perhaps a more English than American model, 
the paramount norm is a hypothetical and unspecified master rule 
of recognition.16 
The capacious and indeterminate identity of the paramount 
norm is a response to certain rhetorical pressures. Inasmuch as the 
13. The Rawlsian theory of justice is famous for the articulation of two fundamental prin­
ciples of justice that the state must satisfy in order to be just. Roughly stated, the first princi­
ple requires a maximization of the total system of liberties. The second principle requires 
that inequalities in wealth, income, and other such primary goods should be distributed so as 
to redound to the least well advantaged. See generally RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra 
note 2. 
14. The hallmark of Bruce Ackerman's recent work is a distinction between normal and 
higher lawmaking. Normal lawmaking occurs when competing interest groups jostle with 
each other in attempting to further their different agendas. There is no great consensus on 
future change. Higher lawmaking, by contrast, occurs when a significant part of the citizenry 
is able to mobilize itself and others for a significant change in the political character of the 
nation. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 270-72. 
15. See DwoRKIN supra note 2, at 255, 405-06. Ronald Dworkin's work is characterized 
by an attempt to fuse moral philosophy with the authoritative materials of law. Both are 
anchored and reflected in the other and each is reconciled with the other according to various 
aesthetic criteria such as "coherence" and "fit." See generally DwoRKIN, supra note 2. 
16. See H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAw 92 (2d ed. 1994). 
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paramount norm must, one way or another, be chosen or accepted 
by its subjects, there is great rhetorical pressure to make this para­
mount norm as inclusive as possible. There is, in short, a tremen­
dous pressure to produce an exceedingly abstract, capacious, and 
perhaps even mystical norm - the kind of norm that will allow 
each of us to read into it whatever we wish to find there. The more 
abstract, mystical, or capacious the paramount norm, the less it will 
exhibit concrete features that might trigger the objection of any 
particular reader. Thus, Dworkin's paramount norm of integrity, 
making the law the best it can be,17 is immensely capacious - capa­
ble of harboring virtually any jurisprudence. Rawls's two principles 
of justice are notoriously fiexible.18 As for Hart's ultimate rule of 
recognition, it verges on the mystical. It is not at all clear what it is, 
what content it may have, or how it may be identified.19 
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUNDATIONS 
In liberal justification the paramount norm, typically, is tempo­
rarily liberated from any historically situated event. In Rawls, this 
is accomplished by bringing the universalizing, abstracting, ahistori­
cal frame of Anglo-American moral philosophy into play. In a real 
sense, the foundational moment in Rawls, "the original position," is 
supposed to be a (virtually) timeless thought experiment - or, as 
he calls it, a "device of representation."20 This founding moment, 
in turn, is achieved as the reader is invited and induced to abstract 
from his or her historical, sociological, and psychological circum­
stances. This emancipation of the paramount norm from any his­
torically or temporally situated event serves to avoid the 
arbitrariness of localizing the founding movement of a particular 
point in historical time. Instead, the paramount norm assumes a 
universal appearance, transcending the confines of historical 
epochs, or the parochial self-interests of any specific generation. 
Bruce Ackerman's work presents an especially interesting twist 
on this emancipation of the paramount norm from history.21 
Through his articulation of the notion of "transformative politics," 
17. See DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 411. 
18. Inasmuch as the Rawlsian scheme does not - and indeed does not set out to -
resolve empirical questions about the relative performance of various economic systems or 
social arrangements, the Rawlsian principles leave a great deal of room for argument over 
which kind of system or arrangement is best: socialism, welfare capitalism, economic liberta­
rianism, and so on. 
19. See HART, supra note 16, at 106. 
20. RAWLS, PounCAL LmERAUSM, supra note 2, at 25-27. 
21. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2. 
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Ackerman maintains the possibility that each generation can con­
tribute to the establishment of a paramount norm through an effort 
at "higher lawmaking," that meets certain requirements of constitu­
tion making.22 In a sense, like the Rawlsian strategy, this approach 
overcomes the arbitrariness of privileging a particular generation 
and a particular epoch in establishing the paramount norm. But, in 
another sense, because of its exigent requirements - quite reminis­
cent of the Constitution's Article V amendment procedures - this 
dispersal of the founding moment nonetheless remains tied to the 
parochial interests of some particular generations and some particu­
lar epochs. Ackerman's peculiar contribution is to spread (and pos­
sibly diffuse) the arbitrariness by dispersing it across multiple 
generations. 
REFASHIONING THE MYTHIC SUBJECT 
The practice of liberal justification also attempts to rework the 
subject who consents to the paramount norm. Recall that the para­
mount norm in liberal justification is not self-validating. The para­
mount norm has to be accepted or ratified by its subjects. These 
subjects are hardly a monolithic crew. Their dispositions, orienta­
tions, identities, interests, and preferences are far from homogene­
ous. The likelihood that any paramount norm would be satisfactory 
to all of them is extremely small. Moreover, they are not always 
receptive to reasoned argument. If these subjects are to accept a 
paramount norm, they will have to be disciplined. Their identities 
will have to be recast in such a way as to make them more manage­
able, more docile, and more compliant. 
And so they are. At the level of the individual the subject is 
recast as coherent, unified, autonomous, self-directing - in short, 
as abstracted individual subjects. In turn, these subjects are sum­
moned, invited, and induced to identify with grand supra-individual 
subjects: "We the People" (Ackerman), "The Interpretive Commu­
nity" (Fiss ), "Persons in the Original Position" (Rawls), or "Hercu­
les" (Dworkin).23 Assuming these new identities, the liberal 
subjects become capable of accepting the paramount norm. 
One problem with this mythical fashioning of supra-individual 
subject identities is that in order for the logic of consent to work, 
the individual liberal subjects must in fact identify with the mythic 
22. See id. at 266-94. 
23. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-7; DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 238-40; RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2, at 11; Owen FISS, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. 
L. REv. 739, 745 (1982). 
14 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1 
supra-individual subject identities. If the individual liberal subjects 
do not identify with these mythic identities, then, of course, 
whatever these mythic identities accept, ratify, or consent to will 
remain beside the point. Liberal thinkers use a variety of rhetorical 
techniques to prompt identification with the mythic self-representa­
tion. Most of these techniques involve the use of moral :flattery, the 
promise of communal belonging, the incentive of self-interest, and a 
certain amount of rhetorical bullying. 
Among the liberal thinkers, Rawls is particularly interesting be­
cause he is the most explicit and self-reflective in his construction of 
a mythic process that will yield consent to a paramount norm. 
Hence, Rawls constructs as a thought experiment an "original posi­
tion" in which artificial persons are to choose behind "a veil of ig­
norance" the principles that are to regulate "the basic structure" of 
society.24 Rawls makes a point of telling his readers that "the origi­
nal position" is a representational device designed specifically to 
yield a choice for his paramount norm - what he calls "justice as 
fairness. "25 
Readers are invited to identify with the person in the original 
position through moral :flattery and an appeal to self-interest. The 
person in the original position is, in his abstraction, universality and 
openness - a moralistic self-image to which readers will feel they 
ought to aspire. At the same time, the person in the original posi­
tion is asked to evaluate various forms of political organization that 
will advance his self-interest. The person in the original position is 
thus a hybrid - conjoined in the observance of morality and the 
pursuit of self-interest. 
What makes the Rawlsian argument remarkable is precisely this 
conjunction of moral attitude and instrumental self-interest as sup­
portive of a choice for his paramount norm. The problem with the 
Rawlsian strategy, as we shall see, is that the person in the original 
position ultimately fails to adequately represent the moral concern 
and the instrumental self-interest of the reader. 
If Rawls is the most interesting in his refashioning of the subject, 
Dworkin is no doubt the most extravagant. If Rawls's subject is 
stripped of flourish and ready for normative submission, Dworkin's 
mythic subject is dressed to kill. Dworkin invites his readers to be­
come "Hercules" - a formidable legal giant gifted with profound 
moral insight and unbounded legal intelligence. Dworkin's scheme 
24. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2, § 3. 
25. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LmERAUSM, supra note 2, at 28. 
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is clearly one of flattery. It is an elaborate self-aggrandizement fan­
tasy that allows each of his readers to become an exalted and gran­
diose self. The problem with this account is that the mythic self­
representation known as Hercules seems to be as much a candidate 
for psychoanalytic intervention as an agency for a legitimate law. 
Indeed, Hercules, while truly grand, turns out to be a fairly vacuous 
fellow ruling over a jurisprudential empire that is very nearly a per­
fect mirror image of his own truly grand though nearly vacuous 
self.26 
Ackerman's work is interesting in that, more than other liberal 
thinkers, he attempts to rework and refashion the mythic subject of 
"The People" in a way that can claim some fidelity to the popular 
constitutional mythology.27 Of the key ontological identities in the 
popular constitutional mythology, it is perhaps "The People" that 
has remained the most abstract and the most elusive. For one thing, 
it has been a long time since "The People" have been seen to act.28 
Th.ere is no obvious concrete referent for "The People." When do 
the People act? In constitutional conventions? In popular initia­
tives? In massive street protests?29 
Nor has the category of "The People" been used much in recent 
American history to describe political or legal events: It remains a 
largely empty abstraction. Few (if any) political or legal actions are 
attributed to the People. The point becomes manifest if one com­
pares the status of the People to the status of The Constitution. In 
contrast with the People, the Constitution is a key ontological iden­
tity that is almost daily infused with meaning and significance. It is 
incessantly invoked, evoked, celebrated, berated, and abused. The 
Constitution is a daily site for contestation, conflict, and thus social 
and political definition. The Constitution is on CNN; the People 
are not. 
Moreover, American culture makes it difficult, both intellectu­
ally and politically, to sustain supra-individual subjects such as the 
People.3o For one thing, if such supra-individual subjects are ac­
corded sufficient depth and significance, they could displace or dis­
turb the centerpiece of American liberalism - namely, the liberal 
individual subject. Accordingly, to the extent that supra-individual 
26. See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte," supra note 3, at 1662-67. 
27. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
28. See id. at 6. 
29. For Ackerman's attempt to work out some of these difficulties, see id. at 272-90. 
30. For one interesting effort to elaborate such a constitutional subject, see Jed 
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 1119 (1995). 
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subjects are allowed on the intellectual or political scene, they are 
weak, ephemeral, schematic. As if in confirmation of the point, the 
obvious supra-individual subject in American life - namely, the 
"community" - is most often cast as a derivative construction, the 
aggregation of individuals and individual action.31 Indeed, in the 
rhetoric of American politics, an appeal to "community" is almost 
always a sure loser - destined to be trumped by appeals to individ­
ual liberty and individual freedom. In short, the Hegelian-Marxist 
tradition that places great importance on collective or supra-indi­
vidual subjects such as "nation" or "class" remains largely foreign 
and antithetical to American intellectual and political life, as do fas­
cistic subjects steeped in notions of "the soil," "the nation," and 
"the blood. "32 
Ackerman's recent works nonetheless attempt to introduce a di­
luted Hegelianism into the American constitutional mythology by 
introducing - or from his perspective, reviving - the mythic sub­
ject "The People." Ackerman's argument strives to prompt a rec­
ognition of the crucial role played by the People in American 
constitutional history. According to Ackerman, it is this mythic 
agency of the People that periodically engages in "higher lawmak­
ing" and thereby yields the paramount norm that is supposed to 
regulate constitutional meaning. Ackerman's argument thus can be 
charitably understood as a kind of sustained reflection on American 
constitutional history, one that allows readers to reach for a self­
conscious recognition of what they already are - namely, potential 
instantiations of "We the People." As Ackerman himself says, 
"[W]e too may find it within ourselves to speak with the voice of 
We the People - so long as we keep the language alive."33 His 
enterprise, as he describes it, is not "to glimpse the shape of Uto­
pia," but to "capture the spirit of the existing historical enterprise 
- to persuade you that this spirit is better captured by the dualist 
emphasis on rule by the People than any competing theory of 
American government. "34 Why should Americans accept this 
mythic self-representation? The answers are classic. First, because 
31. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmCS 76-81, 128, 211 
(1975). 
32. Even American racism seems organized more around schemes of exclusion, denigra­
tion, and hatred rather than on the celebration or worship of "blood" or "the nation." For 
further exploration, see RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRmCAL WHITE STUDIES: 
LooKING BEHIND THE MmRoR (1997). 
33. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 302. 
34. Id. at 321. 
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Americans already do.3s Second, because it is morally appealing.36 
And third, because it is in their interest.37 
REPRODUCING CONSENT 
Yet another point at which the liberal justification is subject to 
rhetorical pressure is in the conceptualization of what it means to 
accept, ratify, or consent to the paramount norm. Insofar as an ap­
peal to an actual historical act of acceptance, ratification, or consent 
by all individual subjects is beyond possibility, the crucial rhetorical 
action of acceptance, ratification, or consent must be redefined and 
refashioned. The problem then becomes to articulate defensible 
criteria for what counts as acceptance, ratification, or consent by 
the mythic subject. 
For Rawls, the requisite consent is generated by the pre-given 
interests of the person in the original position. For Ackerman, the 
problem of consent is trans-substantiated into what counts as a le­
gitimate act of higher lawmaking by his mythic subject, "We the 
People." As Ackerman puts it: 
What fundamental criteria should be used to judge a movement's 
claim to speak for "the People"? How should a higher lawmaking 
system be designed that can reliably distinguish between the rare oc­
casions upon which a mobilized majority of American citizens ham­
mer out a considered judgment on a fundamental matter of principle, 
and the countless decisions of normal politics?38 
For Owen Fiss, the problem of specifying what would count as ac­
ceptance, ratification, or consent never seems to arise at all.39 It is 
outside the realm of his inquiry and is simply presumed. The entire 
question of how the interpretive community comes to recognize 
its legitimate "disciplining rules" is not a question for Fiss; it just 
does - end of story. For Fiss, the relation of the mythic self­
representation to the paramount norm - specifically, the interpre­
tive community to the disciplining rules - is one of reciprocal con­
stitution.40 No more, no less. Thus, one can see a certain common 
35. See, e.g., id. at 5. 
36. See, e.g., id. at 316. Note that while Ackerman insists repeatedly that his is not a 
utopian project, nonetheless, participation in his vision is rewarded by the promise of a gran­
diose and morally self-flattering role. 
37. As Ackerman puts it, "Are you quite sure that it is in your self-interest to scoff at the 
very idea of citizenship, when you may later want to protect your own hide by appealing to 
others to take a broad view of the public good?" Id. at 313. 
38. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 55. 
39. See Fiss, supra note 23. 
40. See id. 
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aesthetic that shapes, more or less loosely, the work of liberal 
thinkers: 
Popular The The Founding The Framers Ratification 
Constitutional Constitution 
Mythology 
Political Philosophy Principles of Original Persons in the Consent 
(John Rawls41) Justice (for the Position Original Position 
basic structure) 
Legal Philosophy The Master Persons taking Acceptance as 
(H.LA. Hart42) Rule of the internal binding 
Recognition perspective 
Constitutional Higher Transformative "We, the People" Popular 
Philosophy Lawmaking Moments Acceptance, 
(Bruce Ackerman43) (17fr7, 1865, with adequate 
1935, etc.) breadth, depth, 
and 
decisiveness 
Constitutional The Court as Dialogue and 
Theory modeled on the reason-giving 
(Frank principle of 
Michelman44) dialogic self-
government 
Theory of The Hercules, the Integrity 
Adjudication authoritative interpretive and fit 
(Ronald Dworkin45) materials made attitude of the 
the best they internal 
can be perspective 
Theory of Disciplining The Interpretive Binding 
Interpretation Rules Community 
(Owen Fiss46) 
The work of liberal justification is accomplished through the refash­
ioning of mythic identities and the relations of the four critical 
terms - the paramount norm, the founding moment, the subject, 
and its consent - in ways that make the myth seem intellectually 
more convincing. 
Of course, not all liberal thinkers rework all of the fundamental 
ontological identities. Some thinkers strive to perform the recon­
struction by locating the crucial problems and the reconstructive 
41. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2. 
42. See Hart, supra note 16. 
43. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2. 
44. See Michelman, supra note 2. 
45. Ronald Dworkin is not a contractarian philosopher. Nonetheless, his fundamental 
ontology remains consonant with the contractarian narrative. See DWORKIN, supra note 2. 
46. See Fiss, supra note 23. 
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work in a few of the fundamental ontological identities. What is 
crucial is that the reworking of some fundamental ontological iden­
tities effectively reconstructs the popular constitutional mythology 
in a way that produces a more convin�.iD.g narrative reconciliation of 
authority, reason, and freedom. 
THE ROLE OF MYTH IN LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION 
In one sense, it is striking just how large a role myth seems to 
play in liberal justification. Indeed, the reliance of liberal justifica­
tion on mythic devices of presentation and argument seems discor­
dant with its self-advertisements as a carefully reasoned enterprise. 
In another sense, of course, there is nothing odd about the use 
of myth in liberal justification. To the extent that liberal law and 
politics are socially constructed - as opposed to, say, divinely pro­
duced, intellectually derived, or a metaphysically given - myth is 
an extremely effective vehicle for the creation and sedimentation of 
liberal belief and liberal practice. Myth serves as a rhetorical device 
for entrenching shared understandings of the political and legal 
world. In this sense, myth operates not simply as a rhetorical lure 
that captivates its audience, but also as one that effectively estab­
lishes and entrenches the identities, relations, and levers that com­
prise the liberal legal and political world. To put it simply: The 
social existence of a shared legal and political world is, in part, a 
creation of myth. To put it perhaps too strongly: If we are going to 
have a legal and political world at all - liberal or not - it will be, 
at least in part, a construction of myth. In a sense, then, it would be 
bizarre, even perverse, to begrudge a legal and political system sim­
ply for its use of myth. 
What is neither perverse nor bizarre is to examine particular 
legal and political myths. It is at this level that the mythic aspect of 
liberal justification becomes interesting. It becomes interesting pre­
cisely because the practice of liberal justification continuously seeks 
to ground liberalism in an authoritative, reasoned, free choice. The 
use of myth may be compatible with authority, but it is in uneasy 
tension with reason and free choice. Indeed, if the myth of reason 
and free choice is to do its work, then it must deny the mythic char­
acter of reason and free choice. This is precisely the role that lib­
eral justification attempts to play: it is the kind of mythic 
construction that depends upon the continuous denial of its own 
mythic character. Liberalism is the myth that dares not speak its 
name. It is, in short, the kind of intellectual enterprise that must 
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continuously deny both what it is and what it does.47 Consider, 
then, the mythic aspects of the four fundamental ontological 
identities. 
The various versions of the paramount norm listed are all cast in 
the language of myth: 
The Principles of Justice 
The Ultimate Rule of Recognition 
Higher Lawmaking 
The Authoritative Materials 
The Disciplining Rules 
These are imaginary constructions endowed with considerable mag­
ical powers. Indeed, consider that these mythic creations might 
function well in a Star Wars movie: "May the Authoritative Materi­
als be with you," or "May you always follow the Master Rule of 
Recognition." 
Of course, there is something facile, even tendentious, in such 
juxtapositions. But there is also a serious point. The narrative 
structure of Star Wars, however impoverished it may be, works pre­
cisely because it mimics in a new vocabulary certain basic myths of 
Western culture: the originary power of the force, the hero who 
becomes at one with the force, the fallen one who rebels against the 
force, the archetypal struggle of good and evil, and so on. The same 
is true of the paramount norms: they draw their persuasive power 
by mimicking, in a new, elusive vocabulary, certain embedded 
myths of western civilization: the origin, the power of the word, the 
ultimate authority. 
The elusiveness of these paramount norms contributes greatly 
to their mythic character. For one thing, the norms are hard to pin 
down and can thus more easily be cast as all-inclusive or ultimate. 
Moreover, their elusiveness serves to elide the question of their 
provenance. To be sure, these paramount norms are binding, regu­
lative, or authoritative because they are accepted by a mythic sub­
ject. But that still leaves open the questions: Where do these 
mythic paramount norms come from? Just how do they come to be 
included on the menu? Or more accurately: How do they become 
the menu? 
The various paramount norms are in turn accepted by a mythic 
subject - a constructed, artificial, schematic subject endowed with 
mythic powers of creation and authority: 
Persons in the Original Position 
47. See Stanley F'tsh, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DuKE LJ. 997. 
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Persons taking the internal perspective 
We the People 
The Court 
Hercules 
The Interpretive Community 
21 
Here too the agencies are endowed with elusive and mysterious 
qualities. Some of these are endowed with an oracular function: 
"The Court" as described by Frank Michelman serves as an agency 
that models dialogic self-govemment.48 
The Court becomes the oracle that mediates between the spirit 
of a republican ideal of government and the masses who must ac­
cept its rule. In more pedestrian versions, The Court is the oracle 
authorized to receive and communicate the meanings of the Consti­
tution for the masses. Other agencies, such as "We the People," 
"Persons in the original position," "The interpretive community,'' 
or tellingly, "Hercules," are not so much oracular as endowed with 
the power to create originary meaning. As befits such agents and 
their Herculean tasks, the methods of creation remain shrouded in 
mystery. 
In tum, consent to the paramount norms itself has mythic pro­
portions. The acceptance is a constructed symbolic event that oc­
curs in highly specified circumstance. Thus in Rawls's work, 
acceptance occurs through the hypothetical and nonhistorical "de­
vice of representation" known as the "original position."49 The ac­
ceptance is deliberately induced through a rhetorical construction 
of the choice and the situation that will prompt such an acceptance. 
In Ackerman's work, acceptance occurs through "transformative 
moments": descriptions of the breadth, depth, and decisiveness of 
popular mobilization required for instances of higher lawmaking.so 
In tum, the acceptance is accorded a transcendent character - one 
that is supposed to cut through time, history, and context to govern 
sundry unanticipated situations. 
It is a measure of the power of such mythic versions of accept­
ance that few respond by saying "So what?" Indeed, amidst all the 
48. I am indebted to Rebecca French for this insight. 
49. Rawls acknowledges - indeed insists - that "the original position is to be seen as a 
device of representation and hence any agreement reached by the parties must be regarded 
as both hypothetical and nonhistorical." RAwr.s, POLITICAL LmERALISM, supra note 2, at 24. 
50. As for Ackerman, he seems to treat his own instances of "higher lawmaking" - his 
"transformative moments" - as significant only to the extent that they are historically real. 
Thus he worries at great {and rhetorically counterproductive) length about what might con­
stitute sufficient political mobilization to count as "higher lawmaking." See ACKERMAN, 
supra note 2, at 272-80. 
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attacks on Ackerman's work, few bother to argue: "So what if 'the 
People' engage in higher lawmaking?" "Why should this matter to 
us?" And again, few attack Ackerman's work by asking, "What do 
you mean higher lawmaking?" "In what sense is it higher, as op­
posed to, say, exalted? transported? visionary? delusional? nuts?" 
The very fact that these questions often do not arise - even for the 
most stalwart critics - bespeaks the mythic power accorded to the 
notions of acceptance and consent in liberal justification. 
In temporal terms, the acceptance functions as an origin, cutting 
off the authority of anterior claims and traversing across future time 
to regulate contexts and circumstances that have not yet arisen. 
The acceptance totalizes political and legal time, subordinating this 
time to the power of a determinate action - acceptance at the 
founding moment. 
In turn, the founding moment is itself cast in mythic language: 
The Founding 
The Original Position 
The Transformative Moments 
The founding moment serves to locate the point in time at which 
the mythic subject consents to the paramount norm. In a sense, the 
foundational moment serves as the vehicle to identify the conver­
gence of the other three fundamental ontological identities: a para­
mount norm that is accepted by the mythical subject. 
The moment of founding, in its singularity and in its distinctive­
ness, is what accords authority and legitimacy to the entire scheme. 
It is the moment of foundation - and its attendant specification -
that enables a sense of one paramount norm that, however abstract, 
is nonetheless singular and unitary.51 The founding moment serves 
as the aesthetic vehicle for the specification of the singular authori­
tative moment for the constitution of the liberal state. It endows the 
particular creation of the paramount norm with political-legal privi­
lege extending indefinitely into the future, transcending context and 
circumstance. 
Even for Ackerman, who insists on pluralizing the foundational 
moment into several - so far three and a half52 - that extend in­
definitely into the future, such moments are nonetheless singular in 
51. Even Ackerman's dualist democracy - his distinction between normal and higher 
lawmaking - is ensconced in the security of an overarching monism. This is the monism of 
Ackerman's own perspective: his singular and at times rather detailed elaboration of dualist 
democracy. In short, Ackerman is in favor of dualist democracy within his own monistic 
understanding of its content and its significance. 
52. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, ls 
NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799, 802-03 (1995). 
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character. To be sure, Ackerman would protest that his particular 
account is designed precisely to avoid such monistic tendencies.53 
In one sense - a limited sense - he is right. In another sense, 
however, even though Ackerman recognizes and anticipates a plu­
rality of founding moments, all of these emerge from the same sin­
gular source, are recognized by the same singular set of criteria, and 
have the same singular status. This is no accident; Ackerman's "re­
constructive" history is history with an attitude. It is a history 
designed for use and implementation by The Court (or the courts), 
and as such it is driven - like all attempts to produce or reform 
American law - toward the production of a single, conclusive, uni­
tary, monistic norm.54 
This drive to recognize a singular moment or moments necessar­
ily seeks to freeze the frame - a unitary paramount norm accepted 
by a single subject in one particular context - in a way that extends 
that frame through political and legal time. It is the mysticism of 
the moment of foundation that negotiates the temporal dilemmas 
of liberal justification. For it is through the moment of foundation 
that the expanse of constitutional and legal time is referred back to 
a single unifying moment. Thus, a single moment can span and reg­
ulate an expanse of time extending indefinitely into the future. 
THE RHETORIC OF LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION 
It is in these ways that liberal justification refashions the identi­
ties and relations of the critical terms of the popular constitutional 
myth. Through an equilibrating action, each of the terms is ren­
dered consonant with the others. Whether called "reflective equi­
librium" (as in Rawls), the "internal perspective" (as in Dworkin), 
or "reciprocal constitution" (as in Piss), the regulative image pro­
duced by proponents of liberal justification is that of the circle.55 
Each crucial term in this circle must be adjusted, refined, and 
elaborated so that it is consonant with each of the other terms. The 
circle of justification must be constructed so that the circular mo­
tion operates smoothly - so that the mythic subject does indeed 
consent to the paramount norm, so that the paramount norm be-
53. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-16. 
54. Ironically, it is precisely Ackerman's need to produce legally cognizable criteria for 
identifying founding moments that propels him to ensconce his otherwise interesting histori­
cal narratives within the pedestrian prescriptive (and absolutely unbelievable) strictures of a 
normative legalism. For a genealogical sketch of the legalistic drive to monism, see Pierre 
Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2053 (1993). 
55. For another exploration of the circular organization of American law, see Pierre 
Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HAR.v. L. REv. f!m, 914-18 (1997). 
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comes authoritative in a founding moment, so that the political and 
legal entailments of that paramount norm sustain the mythic 
subject. 
Not only must the circle of justification operate smoothly, but at 
some point - and perhaps at several - it must induce the con­
sumer of liberal justification to jump in. That is, the consumer must 
be induced to enter the circle in order to complete, if only symboli­
cally, its crucial circular operations. Through whatever entry point, 
the consumer must identify with the mythic subject, subordinate 
himself to the founding moment, and choose the paramount norm. 
The circular motion of liberal justification must become the con­
sumer's own. As Frank Michelman puts it, "The argument, then, is 
that the philosophical project of political liberalism is possible for 
us (if it is) because, as it happens, a certain conception of the person 
appeals to us as an account of a truth of our being."56 How, then, 
does liberal justification induce the entry of the consumer into the 
circle? What is important here is not only that the consumer enter 
the circle of justification, but that he do so in a liberal fashion. He 
must choose liberal constitutionalism as authoritative, and he must 
do so on the basis of reason. 51 
fn asking how the consumer is induced to enter the circle of 
liberal justification, I have deliberately represented the consumer as 
being outside the circle of liberal justification. This location of the 
consumer outside the circle is in important ways wrong, as dis­
cussed later, but it is (1) consistent with the self-representations of 
liberal justification, and (2) helpful to elucidate the rhetorical tech­
niques through which liberal thinkers persuade their consumers to 
enter the circle. 
Consonant with this representation of the consumer as outside 
the machinations of the myth, liberal justification confronts the con­
sumer with a momentous decision - a decision either for or against 
liberalism. Liberal justification almost invariably confronts its con­
sumer with an either/or choice: choose the myth or face perdition. 
Within the circle there is something good, appealing, admirable, 
necessary, sensible, reasonable (this is liberalism), while on the 
outside there is something bad, unappealing, contemptible, avoid­
able, senseless, and unreasonable (this is the antithesis of liberalism 
56. Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of Liberalism, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1831 (1994) 
(book review). 
57. See, e.g., GAUS, supra note 9, at 129, 292 ("Liberal politics requires, first that citizens 
recognize their moral conunitment to justify their demands on each other • • • •  "). 
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and goes by names such as chaos, tyranny, totalitarianism, and so 
on). 
This specific use of the either/or structure is not merely an inci­
dental or hyperbolic rhetorical gesture. On the contrary, it is an 
essential aspect of liberal justification. It is essential because liberal 
justification requires that the consumer make a choice for an entire 
system of political governance. That is precisely the logic of justifi­
cation instantiated by the idea of a paramount norm: for liberal 
thinkers, the point is precisely to get the consumer to consent to the 
paramount norm. Once that is achieved, the hierarchical superior­
ity and overarching character of the paramount norm guarantee as 
a matter of course that the rest of the liberal vision, in all its con­
crete detail, is "on the whole" justified. To put it another way, 
within the liberal vision, consent to the paramount norm directly 
and necessarily entails consent to a whole series of institutions and 
practices that are authorized by the paramount norm. Once the 
paramount norm is accepted, it is as if the entire liberal pinball 
machine lights up.ss 
How is this consent elicited from the consumer? How is the 
consumer induced to enter the circle of justification and perform its 
actions as her own? At stake here are rhetorical negotiations be­
tween the mythic representations of liberal justification and the so­
cial conditions of the consumer. 
FEAR, SHAME, SEDUCTION, AND ROMANCE 
Part of the answer is emotion. It is through the medium of emo­
tion - through fear, shame, seduction, and romance - that the 
consumer of liberal justification is induced to enter the circle of jus­
tification. The irony of this answer, given the insistence of liberal 
justification on choice and rationality, is worthy of some considera­
tion. But for now, let us consider the role of emotion in liberal 
justification. 
The consumer of liberal justification must come to view the 
mythic subject as a fitting representation of herself and thus come 
to view the paramount norm as something to which she chooses to 
submit. There are two important and often intertwined moments 
here. 
One moment entails the reconstruction of the consumer's self­
identity so that she chooses submission to the paramount norm. 
This reconstruction typically entails inducing the consumer to un-
58. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83. 
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derstand herself as an abstracted individual - an autonomous, self­
directing, coherent self - ready to choose submission to the para­
mount norm. This is quite a feat, for the consumer must be induced 
to understand this abstract liberal subject - what Merleau-Ponty 
called the empty subject59 - as a fitting re-presentation and repre­
sentative of herself, her condition, needs, wants, orientations, tastes, 
and so on. The consumer must come to believe that this abstracted 
subject, this universal subject, somehow accurately represents her 
core, inner self, in its essence, at its best, at its truest. Liberal rheto­
ric will by turns frighten, shame, seduce, and even romance the con­
sumer into taking on the identity and the perspective of the liberal 
subject. 
The second important moment is the prompting of an actual 
choice. True, much of the groundwork for this "choosing" has al­
ready been accomplished in the refashioning of the consumer's 
identity as an abstracted individual subject. But more is required. 
The consumer must actually choose submission to this particular 
paramount norm. The consumer's motivations must be elicited and 
evoked so that she is prompted to choose. Once again the con­
sumer is, by turns, frightened into submission, shamed into acquies­
cence, seduced into consent, or ultimately romanced into 
identification with the paramount norm. 
Hobbes's defense of Leviathan as protection against a life that 
would otherwise be nasty, brutish, and short is perhaps the most 
famous example of the liberal - or rather proto-liberal - use of 
fear to induce submission.6° The success of the Hobbesian gesture 
depends upon the credibility of a rhetoric of static opposition: on 
this side, liberal belief; on that side, terror, tyranny, and totalitari­
anism. The rhetorical premise is that liberal belief has a robust 
ontological identity - an essence that renders liberal belief (and its 
political institutions) at once distinct from and impervious to terror 
and tyranny. Implicit in this rhetoric is the supposition that some­
thing about liberal belief - never specified and always presumed 
- prevents liberal belief - and its political institutions - from 
evolving or collapsing into totalitarianism, terror, and tyranny. 
59. "There are at bottom only two ideas of subjectivity - that of empty, unfettered, and 
universal subjectivity, and that of full subjectivity sucked down into the world - and it is the 
same idea . • • .  " MAURICE MERLEAU-PoNTY, Everywhere and Nowhere, in SIGNS 126, 154 
(John Wild ed. & Richard C. McCleary trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1964) (1960). 
60. Hobbes frames the appeal of "Leviathan" (the state) on the basis of an either/or: 
Either Leviathan or the "war . . .  of every man, against every man." THOMAS HOBBES, LBVI· 
ATIIAN 84 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651). 
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This is reminiscent of the rhetoric now so common in contempo­
rary fear-advertising: "Afraid of cancer? Eat this everyday." 
"Afraid of totalitarian regimes or chaos? Choose liberal belief." In 
both cases, of course, there is plenty to fear. But in both cases -
liberalism or cereal - it is doubtful that the precautions are fully 
efficacious. 
The either/or gesture has been repeated many times, as liberals 
have sought to represent liberal belief and its political institutions 
as a bulwark against totalitarianism, terror, and tyranny. The ges­
ture implies that only a choice for liberalism - often, the author's 
version of liberalism - will forestall the advent of inhuman condi­
tions. Bruce Ackerman, a leading liberal thinker, recently upped 
the emotional ante by personalizing the gesture. As he put it, "Are 
you quite sure that it is in your self-interest to scoff at the very idea 
of citizenship, when you may later want to protect your own hide by 
appealing to others to take a broad view of the public good?"61 In a 
sense, this gesture resembles emotional blackmail: accept the lib­
eral justification or you may find yourself unable to protect your 
interests, perhaps even yourself. 
Interestingly, this gesture seems to work (at least some of the 
time) even though it is a non sequitur. Indeed, given that whether 
or not the consumer (you) chooses to be for or against liberalism is 
of no moment whatsoever for the survival or continuation of the 
liberal state, why should anyone be persuaded by this gesture to 
choose liberalism? 
One answer is fear. Fear, after all, does not have to be rational. 
But there is more to it than that. The Hobbesian gesture is perhaps 
aimed not so much at inducing a choice for liberalism as it is aimed 
at raising the stakes for the consumer. The momentous character of 
the choice - liberalism or tyranny - sets the scene for the intro­
duction of other motivating forces - namely, shaming and seduc­
tion. The following passage, drawn from Bruce Ackerman's recent 
work, presents an excellent example of the interplay of seduction 
and shame. As Ackerman intimates, either you follow him on the 
pathways of dignity and nobility or you are a grunting animal: 
You are not alone on Earth; you share your time and space with 
others, lots of others, who differ with you about lots of things. How to 
come to terms with this basic fact? You may simply seek to oppress 
others through force and fraud. Or you may try to come to terms 
with them about the best way to associate together. Isn't there a cer­
tain dignity in the second course? Isn't there something noble in call-
61. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 313 (emphasis added). 
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ing upon yourself, by calling upon others, to put some intelligible 
form upon your social life together? If we are not to live as mere 
brutes, grunting past one another in the night, surely we owe at least 
this much to each other?62 
Seduction is also an important part of the liberal rhetoric, which 
typically goes to great lengths to praise the consumer who accepts 
the liberal justification. Such a consumer is praised for her moral 
concern, her moral acumen, and her regard for others. Frank 
Michelman, referring to a constitutional liberal, puts it this way: 
"Who can do better than to live the best she can according to the 
sort of being she finds herself believing herself to be . . . ?"63 In 
addition, the consumer who acquiesces in the liberal justification is 
praised not only for her moral qualities, but also for her reason and 
reasonableness. 
On the other side of seduction is shame. The consumer who 
does not accede to the liberal justification is threatened with shame 
and possibly moral or intellectual exile. In Ackerman's work, the 
nonconforming consumers are degraded to the status of animal life 
- brutes "grunting past one another in the night." In Michelman's 
work, the failure to accede to the Rawlsian political vision has per­
sonal implications for whether the consumer is truly a human being 
or not. Indeed, rejection of the Rawlsian vision calls into question 
"whether (for this purpose) your kind is anything less than the 
human kind."64 
The intensity of these shaming devices serves not only to induce 
a choice for liberalism but also to induce consumers to participate 
in the practice of liberal justification itself - to continue the con­
versation within the terms established by liberal justification. Here 
too, the either/or rhetorical structure performs quite efficaciously. 
Either one engages in the practice of liberal justification or one is 
reduced to the unenviable status of the grunting brute, the 
inhuman. 
These examples are but some of the more flamboyant instances 
of shaming rhetoric in the literature of liberal justification. They 
are extreme manifestations of a more muted, but prevalent, ethos 
of shame. Liberal shaming portrays the mature, responsible, rea­
sonable, coherent, integrated self as one that will choose liberalism. 
Meanwhile, the rejection of liberalism is depicted as the product of 
character flaws - childish romanticism and frivolity (often ascribed 
62. Id. at 313-14. 
63. Michelman, supra note 56, at 1832. 
64. Id. at 1833. 
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to the extreme left) ,  or crude egoism and cruelty (often ascribed to 
the extreme right). 
B eyond fear, shame, and seduction, liberal justificati on also em­
ploys romance. This is where the liberal plot picks up. L iberal ro­
mance, like many other forms of political romance, enacts a 
narrative of reconciliation. Indeed, liberal justifi cation promises to 
dissolve a series of troublesome binary oppositiop.s that have 
marked not only philosophy, but also ethi cs, personality, and li fe 
itself. It is in the promise to dissolve the active man ifestations of 
these oppositi ons that liberal justification achi eves its appeal and its 
greatness. For instance, liberal justification promises to reconcile 
the individual with the community,65 the concrete with the univer­
sal,66 reason with authority,67 ethic with interest,68 and is with 
ought.69 
Moreover, liberal ju stification promises such reconci liations not 
just conceptually, but politically in our institutions, socially in our 
culture, and emotionally in our personal lives. Liberal justification 
promises, in short, to reunite liberal citizens with each other, with 
themselves, and with their fate. 
Consider, as an example, the promise to reconci le the individual 
with the community - private cost with social cost, private interest 
with public interest, and so on. Liberal justification promises to 
reconcile these oppositions through the rhetorical trope of self-rule, 
of self-government, of self- legislation, or, as many i n  America call 
it, " popular sovereignty. " In the liberal justification, the paramount 
norm is ruling. It rules us. B ut, it has been chosen by us. In a 
fundamental sense the paramount norm is us. We are, in short, 
ruled by ourselves. 
Liberal justification thus promises communal redemption: We 
shall be as one again. We are i nvited to come home and to belong 
once more. The seductive appeal of this romance of reconciliation 
is not to be d�nied. A nd it is indeed regularly invoked by liberal 
thinkers. For example, B ruce Ackerman writes: 
Behold, then ... an America in which a rediscovered Constitution is 
the subject of an ongoing dialogue amongst scholars, professionals, 
and the people at large; an America in which this dialogue between 
theory and practice allows the citizenry, and its political representa-
65. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2; RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2. 
66. See generally RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2. 
67. See generally FJSS, supra note 46. 
68. See generally RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2. 
69. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 2. 
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tives, a deepening sense of its historical identity as it faces the trans­
forming challenges of the future.10 
This is moving stuff. The question is, what does it move? One an­
swer is that it is supposed to move the readers. It is supposed to 
move them to a singular, unifying, and "deepening sense of [their] 
historical identity."71 
The use of such emotional devices in liberal justification is 
rather ironic. Liberal justification, true to its form, insists that its 
consumers make a reasoned choice for liberal constitutionalism. In­
deed, this reasoned choice is an essential aspect of liberal belief. 
The choice for the liberal state must appear the reasoned choice of 
a coherent, self-directing, autonomous individual subject. Unlike 
the circles of belief exemplified in theocratic, fascistic, or commu­
nist ideologies, liberalism depends upon a demonstration that it can 
be the outcome of reasoned choice by those who are ruled. It is 
thus ironic that the addressee of liberal justification is systemati­
cally frightened, shamed, seduced, and romanced into acquiescence. 
Perhaps the use of such emotional devices can be reconciled 
with the liberal insistence on reasoned choice. Still, it is no easy 
task, for in liberal justification fear, shame, seduction, and romance 
are used not merely to influence choice, but, more problematically, 
to compensate for a lack of knowledge and for the inadequacy of 
reason in making such a choice. Thus, the Hobbesian gesture 
evokes fear to represent the alternative to liberalism as essentially 
bleak and undesirable, while it deploys romance to eclipse an un­
known political future with enticing images of communal reconcilia­
tion and noble deeds. Hence, when knowledge and reason fall 
short of liberal ambitions, it is emotion that takes up the slack. 
More problematic still for liberal justification, the use of these 
emotional devices constructs a coercive frame within which the ad­
dressee must exercise his reasoned choice. The either/or structure 
of the Hobbesian choice is both elicited and reinforced through 
fear, shame, and seduction. The coercion here may be difficult to 
appreciate, for if is coercion aimed at producing a choice - and 
within liberal thought, choice and coercion are offered as mutually 
exclusive.72 Yet, the coercion of liberal justification lies precisely in 
70. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 5. 
71. Id. 
72. On this point, consider the amusing interchange between Richard Epstein and Gary 
Peller in a 1988 Cornell Law Review symposium. See Richard A. Epstein, The Classical 
Legal Tradition, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 292 (1988); Gary Peller, The Classical Theory of Law, 
73 CoRNELL L. REv. 300 (1988); Discussion: The Classical Theory of Law, 13 CORNELL L. 
REv. 310 (1988). 
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forcing its consumer to choose for or against liberalism. And not 
only is the consumer forced to choose, he is forced to believe that 
this choice matters greatly. Indeed, one could hardly imagine a per­
son placed in Rawls's original position saying back to his author: 
Look here dear author, the sort of predicament that you have put me 
in is really quite preposterous. Human beings, as you know, are not 
"persons in the original position." Human life is not lived well ab­
stractly. And politics do not generally run from the top down. What 
is more, reason would require that I know a great deal more about my 
situation before I seal my fate. I refuse to play, I refuse to decide. 
The choices you are giving me have been forced upon me and as a 
human being - or at least human-being-in-waiting - I believe that it 
is simply not rational to participate in this exercise. 
Why is it that a person in the original position would not say 
this? The short answer is that he has been constructed not to say 
this. What about the "real" consumer of liberal justification? Is 
this someone equipped to resist the rhetoric of liberal justification? 
No. 
The "real" consumer of liberal justification is already deeply en­
sconced in the circles of liberal justification, for he is himself al­
ready a mythified construction. As intimated earlier, the image of 
the consumer as someone induced from the outside to enter the cir­
cle of liberal justification is wrong. In many important senses, the 
consumer is already within the circles of liberal justification. 
It is time to take stock of the circles. 
THE RHETORIC OF THE CIRCLE 
The Circle of Politics 
The first circle of liberal justification is perhaps the most easily 
recognizable. This is a circle that entails a sovereign people (a 
mythic subject) choosing a constitution (a paramount norm) that 
sustains and protects the sovereign people (the mythic subject). 
Liberal justification demands an equilibration between the para­
mount norm and its subjects. This circularity is explicit in the vari­
ous attempts at liberal justification. 
Myth on Myth 
More problematic still for liberal justification is the myth on 
myth circularity. Liberal justification as myth does not operate 
upon some unprocessed, unmediated political reality. Rather, it op­
erates upon artifacts and relations constructed through the popular 
constitutional mythology. In other words, liberal justification is -
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like all successful myth - a meta-myth. As myth, liberal justifica­
tion enables the interpretation - and validation - of a prior, more 
vulgar, but also more pervasive version of itself. All the referents 
of liberal justification - the state, rights, liberty, freedom, the con­
stitution, the self, and so on - are all already artifactual references 
encoded with the myth of liberal constitutionalism. 
Liberal justification, in short, intervenes at a point where mythi­
cal representation has already done much of its work. This point 
can be corroborated by an examination of the leading works of lib­
eral justification. In such works, there is virtually never any critical 
inquiry into the ontological status and the political efficacy of refer­
ents such as rights, liberty, norms, values, the state, reason, auton­
omy, the self, and the like. Liberal justification may well place the 
substantive meanings of these terms in question - and indeed often 
does - but their referentiality to something real, stable, and so­
cially and politically efficacious is never seriously in doubt.73 In­
deed, the sometimes heated internecine squabbles among liberals 
as to the precise meaning or significance of these terms ironically 
reinforces their apparent reality. The liberal thinker approaches a 
category such as "rights" with the same degree of credulity that a 
medieval scholar approaches the category of "angels," or a commu­
nist apparatchik the category of "bourgeoisie." 
This myth-on-myth circularity helps explain a certain shallow­
ness to the enterprise of liberal justification. In part, this shallow­
ness is quite understandable. The mythology of liberalism is an 
already actualized mythology: many of the categories of lived social 
and political existence are liberal categories. The dominant image 
of human beings as liberal individual subjects thus is not just an 
intellectual construction of liberal thinkers; it is also the prevailing 
self-image throughout American society. Similarly, the term 
"rights" is not just some bit of liberal political utopianism. It is a 
recurrent and, in important ways, consequential utterance routinely 
invoked by lawyers, judges, political groups, ethnic groups, citizens, 
children, and so on. Given the apparent social and political actuali­
zation of liberal categories, it is understandable that liberal thinkers 
would presume that liberal categories such as rights, liberty, norms, 
values, the state, reason, autonomy, and the self are ontologically 
referential and politically efficacious. 
But this presumption is nonetheless a kind of ontological cate­
gory mistake. The prevalence of liberal categories in American so-
73. See Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1681 (1996). 
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ciety does not establish their ontological identity; it does not 
establish whether liberal categories such as "individual rights" are 
on the order of rocks, trees, dollar bills, rubles, words, advertising 
images, or angels. Similarly, the prevalence of popular belief in lib­
eral categories such as individual rights in no way establishes the 
social and political roles and efficacy of such referents. 
This myth-on-myth circularity is precisely what enables liberal 
justification to eschew inquiry into the ontological identity and the 
social and political roles of the key liberal referents - rights, lib­
erty, norms, values, the state, reason, autonomy, the self, and so on. 
Hence, what liberalism sets out to justify is its own description of the 
world. This would not be a useless task if liberal justification were a 
bit more critical of its own description of the world. But this is 
something it does not do and indeed cannot do without transform­
ing itself into a significantly different intellectual enterprise. 
The myth-on-myth circularity belies the critical pretensions of 
liberal justification. Indeed, practitioners of liberal justification 
often represent that the theoretical articulation of a liberal ideal 
serves as a basis for criticism of liberal practice, a benchmark by 
which to measure the successes and failures of concrete practice. 
This claim - one that is generally unsupported - loses much of its 
plausibility and appeal once one recognizes that it is not liberal 
practice per se that will be called to account in the court of liberal 
theory. Rather, what will be called to account is an already mythol­
ogized representation of practice - a representation of practice al­
ready inscribed in terms of the liberal mythology. 
What is promised is an examination of the gap between the 
ideal and the reality. What is delivered is an examination of the gap 
between a higher order ideal (liberal justification) and a lower or­
der ideal (popular liberal mythology). Ironically, while the higher 
order ideal is often represented as controlling the lower order ideal, 
it is often little more than an idealized abstraction of the lower or­
der ideal. 
The Circle of the Mythifi.ed Subject 
Liberal justification, as suggested, does its work not only by 
fashioning an image of the liberal state that conforms to its subjects, 
but by shaping its subjects - its consumers - to conform to the 
idea of the liberal state. The very configuration of the liberal sub­
ject is a mimesis of the liberal state. 
In one sense, this is quite unremarkable. It cannot be of sur­
prise - given the political and social actualization of liberalism -
34 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1 
that the consumer of liberal justification is someone whose political 
world is already mapped out in liberal categories. Moreover, in 
light of the social and political inscription of categories such as 
rights, reason, norms, choice, deliberation, and so on, it comes as no 
surprise that the consumer of liberal justification already under­
stands his world as operationally organized in terms of these kinds 
of artifacts and relations. Indeed, the consumer of liberal justifica­
tion is himself already constructed as a mimesis of the liberal state. 
The liberal individual subject is a representation of the self that is 
circulated throughout the culture of liberal society - its literature, 
advertisements, schooling, morality, religion, and so on. What lib­
eral justification does (more myth-on-myth) is refine, elaborate, 
and reinforce this particular self-representation. 
The point is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in John Rawls's 
elaboration of the character of persons in the original position. Ac­
cording to Rawls, the original position is an artificial construction 
designed "to model both freedom and equality and restrictions on 
reasons in such a way that it becomes perfectly evident which 
agreement would be made by the parties [the persons in the origi­
nal position] as citizens' representatives."74 The consumer, of 
course, is invited to consider what would be a fair characteristic to 
attribute to such mythical persons. 
It turns out that the person in the original position has certain 
character traits and confronts political questions that are them­
selves already instantiations of the liberal mythology. This is a per­
son who is stripped of all information about his actual status in 
society, his particular predilections and tastes. He is told that he 
may want to pursue any number of life plans and that he values 
certain basic goods generally thought necessary to the pursuit of 
those life plans: liberties, wealth, income, and the bases of self­
respect. He is self-interested, rational, and not given to envy.7s 
74. RAWLS, POLITICAL LmERAUSM, supra note 2, at 26. 
75. Hence persons in the original positions are: 
(1) deprived of knowledge of their actual social or economic positions, and their partic­
ular conceptions of the good life, their actual talents, or their psychological propensities; 
(2) limited in their choices to "a short list of alternatives given by the tradition of moral 
and political philosophy"; 
(3) limited to choosing principles that apply to the basic structure of the society; 
(4) limited to choosing certain instrumentally necessary primary goods defined as basic 
liberties, powers, and prerogatives of office, income, wealth, and the social bases of self­
respect; 
(5) endowed with means/ends rationality; and 
(6) endowed with rational autonomy. 
See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 2, at 118-50. 
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In short, persons in the original position are constructed as ahis­
torical, abstracted, depersonalized, autonomous, self-directing, inte­
grated, unified, but virtually empty subjects.76 They are sketches, 
schemas, formal outlines of a human being. They are, as Rawls 
himself repeatedly insists, "representations."77 Their mission in life 
is to represent the interests of fully fleshed human beings who are 
rich in experiences, hopes, tastes, and so on.7s 
Persons in the original position know that they are mere repre­
sentations and that the subjects they represent will have specific 
tastes, preferences, ambitions, hopes, and fears. The represented 
will be fully fleshed-out human beings. 
What we have in the Rawlsian framework is the familiar drama 
of liberal representation - one in which empty subjects (that is, 
persons in the original position) represent full subjects (that is, live 
human beings) and lay down the ruling norms for the latter. The 
Rawlsian scheme is thus but one instance of a classic liberal separa­
tion between the empty subject and the full subject. This separa­
tion usually tacks the following associations: 
The Empty Subject Is: The Full Subject Is: 
Universal Particular 
Abstract Concrete 
Transcendental Contingent 
Depersonalized Personal 
Ahistorical Historical 
Public Private 
Reason Desire 
Objective Subjective 
Once the full and the empty subjects are separated in this way, lib­
eral justification typically establishes certain relations between the 
empty subject and the full subject. The empty subject must be au­
thorized to represent and to legislate for the full subject. 
In Rawls's work, as in liberal justification generally, it is crucial 
that the empty subject be considered a legitimate representation of 
76. For a criticism of Rawls's tbeory of justice in terms of tbe abstract character of his 
persons in tbe original position, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND TiiE LIMITS OF 
JurnCE (1982). 
77. See RAWLS, PounCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 24, 27, 35. 
78. Hence, tbey are close approximations of what Merleau-Ponty once called "the empty 
subject." The empty subject is one version, or rather one mode, of tbe liberal individual 
subject. The empty subject is pictured as autonomous, coherent, self-directing, and unified. 
It is abstract, depersonalized, ahistorical, and seemingly universal. This is the kind of subject 
tbat is typically addressed and called fortb in philosophy seminars and law school classes -
tbis is tbe individual subject as greatest common denominator, tbe subject who can rise above 
his or her own particular circumstances. The emptiness of tbis subject stems precisely from 
tbe fact tbat, in order to represent everyone, tbis subject must be stripped of all particular 
content. See MERLEAu-PoNTY, supra note 59, at 154. 
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the full subject. The empty subject must perform as a fitting sym­
bolic, psychological, and political representation of the full subject. 
The reason is obvious: the consumer of liberal justification - who 
is both an empty and a full subject - must acquiesce to his repre­
sentation by the empty subject. He must accept the notion that it is 
reasonable to allow empty subjects to choose norms for full sub­
jects. He is asked to accede to the logic of legitimate representa­
tion; that as a full subject, his interests will be protected because the 
only legitimate role of the empty subject is to represent those inter­
ests - not to substitute better ones, not to legislate morality. 
The representation of the empty subject entitles the empty sub­
ject to legislate for the full subject - to choose the norms by which 
the full subject will live. This is, of course, precisely what is asked 
of persons in the original position and of all other consumers of 
liberal justification. They are asked as empty subjects to decide 
upon ultimate norms to govern the conduct of full subjects.79 
The authorization of the empty subject to represent and legis­
late for the full subject is not only played out in liberal justification, 
but will indeed be inscribed repeatedly in the very laws of the lib­
eral state. Hence, the image of the subject - the person protected 
by the rights contained in the Constitution - is abstract, universal, 
and essentially formal. Similarly, the dominant image of the judge 
who applies the law of the liberal state is that of a subject who is 
neutral, detached, dispassionate, and above the fray. Indeed, a 
judge can lay claim to the authority of the community, and to the 
authority to represent its interests, to the extent that he can repre­
s ent himself as an empty subject - abstract, universal, 
depersonalized. 
How exactly does liberal justification induce the consumer to 
allow the empty subject to represent and legislate for the full sub­
ject? The short answer is that liberal justification invites the con­
sumer to identify with the empty subject. Significantly, the 
consumer consulted here is the consumer as both empty and as full 
subject. In fact, Rawls's original position might be seen as a kind of 
pedagogical device designed to train the full subject to frame and 
refashion his arguments in terms of public reason - that is, in 
terms that are worthy of consideration by an empty subject. 
79. The pedigree for this move is considerable. It is implicit, for instance, in Kant's cate­
gorical imperative which summons an empty subject to lay down the rule for the full subject 
See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 38-46, 
54-56 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1949). 
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The action of liberal justification occurs both on the level of the 
individual and on the level of the collective. On the level of the 
individual, liberal justification, while recognizing both the impor­
tance of the empty as well as the full subject, strives to produce an 
integration of the full subject by the empty subject. The image of 
the self championed by liberal ethics is of a self that is integrated, 
coherent, consistent, centered - an image not unlike a circle. The 
empty subject envelops the richness and variety of the full subject 
and disciplines this full subject to the formal laws of the empty sub­
ject: autonomy, coherence, consistency, unity. All aspects of per­
sonality are linked in a continuous integrated whole - in short, the 
image of a bounded, gapless, figure - not unlike that of a circle. 
Notice that in this construction of the self, the full subject is 
neither ignored nor jettisoned. The full subject is merely 
subordinated to the formal laws of the empty subject. Thus 
emerges a hierarchy, one in which the empty subject is authorized 
to rule. This subordination of the full subject to the law of the 
empty subject is effectuated by addressing the consumer both as 
empty and full subject. By addressing the consumer as an empty 
subject, liberal justification seduces or shames her into assuming 
this more noble and more ethically appealing version of herself, fur­
ther causing her to put aside her own particular tastes, preferences, 
idiosyncrasies, and other concrete aspects. By addressing the con­
sumer as a full subject, liberal justification uses greed and fear to 
convince the consumer that it is in her own interest - within her 
own particular tastes, preferences, and idiosyncrasies as a full sub­
ject - to acquiesce in the rules laid down by the empty subject. 
Once the full subject has acceded to the rule of the empty subject, 
the same formal hierarchy is then reproduced on the political level. 
Once having taken on this particular psychological configuration, 
the consumer will easily - indeed, naturally - accede to its polit­
ical equivalent. From a psychological representation of the self -
as a full subject ruled psychologically by an empty subject - we 
move to a political representation of the self - as a full subject 
ruled politically by an empty subject. The movement can be sche­
matized as followsso: 
Full 
Psychological 
Subject 
enveloped 
and 
ruled by 
Empty 
Psychological 
Subject 
Liberal Image 
= of Full Political 
Subject 
80. The schematization here tracks Roland Barthes's representation of language and 
myth as two "staggered" semiological systems. See BARnras, supra note 1, at 115. 
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It is crucial to liberal justification to establish (1) the separation be­
tween the empty and the full subject, as well as the authority of the 
empty subject to (2) represent and (3) legislate for the full subject. 
More is accomplished in these three moves than might at first ap­
pear. Each of these three moves yields a crucial implication. 
The separation of the full and the empty subject enables liberal 
justification to train its consumer to effectuate this separation as a 
matter of her own psychological structure. In effect, liberal justifi­
cation trains its consumer to assume the identity of the empty sub­
ject - to abstract herself from her peculiar circumstances, her 
particular engagements, her specific tastes and preferences. Once 
the psychological separation between the full and the empty subject 
is in place in the consumer, she will, of course, choose a political 
form that corresponds to her dual essence - as both an empty and 
a full subject. The psychological separation of the empty subject 
from the full subject corresponds to a political separation between 
the liberal state and civil society, between the public realm and the 
private sector.s1 
This correspondence between the psychological and the political 
in liberal justification is also reflected in the relation known as rep­
resentation for the full subject. Just as the consumer of liberal justi­
fication understands the relation of empty and full subject to be one 
of representation, so too will she understand the relation between 
state and civil society, public realm and private realm, to be a rela­
tion of representation. This means that the state cannot legiti­
mately represent interests beyond those shared within civil society. 
Its powers, like those of the empty subject, are limited. The limited 
representation of the full subject by the empty subject is thus repro­
duced at the political level. The limited character of state power, in 
turn, evokes the
· 
characteristic anxiety of the liberal thinker over 
what social, institutional, and discursive mechanisms can best main­
tain the limits on state power: the problematics of judicial review, 
the countermajoritarian difficulty, the intertemporal difficulty, sep­
aration of powers, and so on. 
81. Karl Marx's essay On the Jewish Question remains perhaps the best demonstration of 
how this distinction is crucial to - indeed constitutive of - the liberal democratic state. See 
KARL MARx, On the Jewish Question (1843}, reprinted in EARLY WRITINGS 211 (Rodney 
Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Vintage Books 1975). 
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Legislation is yet another crucial point of correspondence be­
tween the psychology and the politics of liberal justification. The 
notion that the empty subject can legislate for the full subject im­
plies that the former is authorized to govern the actions of the latter 
- and that the full subject will conduct its affairs within the norms 
established by the empty subject. This relation of legislation is re­
produced at the political level. The consumer of liberal justifica­
tion, in identifying with the empty subject, authorizes the latter to 
lay down the law. Inasmuch as the empty subject is identified with 
the public sector and the full subject with the private realm, the 
relation is transposed from one set to the other: just as the empty 
subject is authorized to lay down the law for the full subject, the 
state is authorized to lay down the law for civil society. 
In the end, perhaps liberal justification seems so persuasive to 
the consumer precisely became the liberal state is already in the con­
sumer's head. There is an isomorphic resemblance between the 
psychological configurations of the liberal subject and the crucial 
political configurations of the liberal state. 
And if, in some moments, liberal justification seems shallow, it 
is precisely because while claiming to be argument - a progression 
of reasoning - it is instead a circular activity. Indeed, liberal justi­
fication is often little more than a game of mirrors in which a partic­
ular aesthetic configuration is reflected from the plane of 
psychology to the plane of politics (and vice versa). The political 
configuration of liberal justification is already implanted in the psy­
chology of the consumer. The consumer is then invited to choose a 
form of political organization appropriate to that psychology.82 
And so on. 
What then sustains this liberal psychology? Part of an answer 
appears if we trace the path of the circle of the mythified subject: 
Liberal psychology renders liberal justification possible, and liberal 
justification establishes the liberal subject by repeatedly positing 
that subject and rehearsing its aesthetic.83 If liberal justification can 
ever begin to do its work, it is in virtue of an articulated premise: 
"Assume you are an individual liberal subject. O.K. now, let's 
talk." There is little difference here, in terms of argumentative aes-
82. This, of course, is somewhat circular. This circularity, in and of itself, is not necessar­
ily a problem. It does, however, become a problem once the shallowness of the circle be­
comes apparent. At that point, the circularity has already ceased to do its job. Similarly, the 
circularity becomes a problem once it is recognized that the circularity was supposed to res­
urrect the foundations and has instead turned out to be a circle resting, as it were, on its 
nonexistent bottom. Again, at this point, the circularity has ceased to do its job. 
83. See Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, supra note 3. 
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thetics, from those who would say, "Assume you are one of God's 
creatures. O.K. now, let's talk." Or yet again: "Assume you are 
the universal class. O.K. now, let's talk." The trick is to presume 
into existence precisely the sort of psychological ontology that con­
duces the desired politics - and what is more, to do so without 
being seen.84 
It is a good trick, possibly an unavoidable trick. But that does 
not guarantee its success. It can fail. The reason is simple: while 
all politics must serve to establish and maintain the kind of subject 
necessary for its continued existence, politics presumes (quite im­
possibly) that it controls the historical, psychological, and cultural 
conditions that render it possible. In virtue of this blind moment of 
presumption, politics must fail. In the case of liberal justification, 
the fission of the individual subject into a full subject regulated by 
an empty subject can seem as natural as existence itself. Then, in 
the next moment, it can seem ludicrous.ss 
In sum, the circle of the mythified subject identifies a circle be­
tween liberal psychology and liberal politics. The circle entails pro­
ducing in the consumer a particular aesthetic configuration - an 
empty subject ruling a full subject - that is then transposed to the 
political plane. The same relations of separation, representation, 
and legislation are then enacted on the plane of politics. This brings 
us to yet another circle. 
The Circle of Justification 
In liberal justification, the circle of the mythified subject is en­
compassed by another circle. This is the circle of justification. This 
circle can be described in terms of a relation between form and 
meaning. 
In any myth, as Roland Barthes suggests, there is a kind of 
structural ubiquity between its meaning and its form; a structural 
ubiquity between the "language object" and the "meta-language."86 
This point is easily illustrated in the context of liberal constitution­
alism. The liberal constitutional mythology posits a sovereign peo­
ple who, through their representatives, establish at a particular 
point in time a constitution that sets forth the powers and the limits 
of legitimate government. This myth is given a naturalized and con­
cretized expression through "meaning." As an illustration of such a 
84. See id. at 1630-31. 
85. See Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte," supra note 3, at 1670-71. 
86. BARnms, supra note 1, at 123. 
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naturalized and concretized expression, one might say that the sub­
stantive meaning of the liberal constitutional myth is that, in 1787, 
certain political leaders convened in Philadelphia where they 
drafted the Constitution - a document that sets forth in various 
articles the powers of the various agencies of government. But the 
myth also has the crucial dimension of "form." As form, one might 
say that the liberal constitutional myth establishes that political 
governance is justified when a mythic subject in the exercise of de­
liberative self-rule chooses a paramount norm to regulate all 
subordinate political activity. 
As Barthes notes, "[T]he signification of the myth is constituted 
by a sort of constantly moving turnstile which presents alternately 
the meaning of the signifier and its form, a language-object and a 
metalanguage . . . .  "En For example, if one had to identify the· mean­
ing and form of the liberal constitutional mythology, one might do 
so as follows: 
Meaning 
(Language-object) 
1787 
The Framers (Madison, 
Hamilton, etc.) 
The Constitution of 1787 
Ratification 
Form 
\Mf"talanguage) 
Founding Moment 
The Mythic Subject 
The Paramount Norm 
Consent/Self-Rule 
While this rendition of the meaning and form of the liberal consti­
tutional mythology may be illustrative, a note of caution is neces­
sary. This rendition leads to the supposition that myth lends itself 
to a noncontroversial distinction and identification of its meaning 
and its form, of its language-objects and its metalanguage. But the 
power of myth lies precisely in the fact that what comprises its form 
and what comprises its meaning is undecidable. Meaning and form, 
language-object and metalanguage, are best conceptualized not as 
determinate entities, but as relations - ultimately unspecifiable 
relations. 
The point can be seen within the context of liberal justification. 
In liberal justification there is a structural undecidability as to 
whether its principal orientation is focused on meaning, the 
language-objects of the constitutional myth, or instead on the form, 
the metalanguage of the constitutional myth. 
One could say that some constitutional thinkers understand the 
tasks of liberal justification as focused on the language-objects of 
87. Id. 
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the constitutional myth. Here one would include the views of so­
called literalists, strict constructionists, originalists, intentionalists, 
and textualists.ss Their understanding of the constitutional myth is 
very much defined by what they take to be its specific meaning, its 
particular language-objects.s9 
In contrast to those who understand the constitutional myth in 
terms of its meaning or its language-objects, some constitutional 
thinkers could be described as committed to the myth in terms of its 
form or its metalanguage. This would include "tjieorists," 
"noninterpretivists," "loose constructionists," and "moral philoso­
phers."90 Their views on the enterprise of constitutional thought 
could be understood as an attempt to practice the metalanguage of 
the constitutional myth - an attempt to reveal its essential animat­
ing spirit. Their focus is on the form of the constitutional myth.91 
Yet, this bipolar classification overstates the differing tendencies 
between these two kinds of constitutional thinkers. As participants 
in the myth, the orientations of both groups necessarily partake in 
some observance of both the language-objects and the metalanguage 
of the constitutional myth. Indeed, for those who participate in this 
kind of myth-making or myth-rehearsing activity, there is a kind of 
reciprocal relation - a circular movement b etween the 
metalanguage and the language-objects of the constitutional myth. 
It is, after all, the language-objects - 1787, the Constitution, ratifi­
cation, amendment, and so on - that map out the form, the 
metalanguage. At the same time, of course, it is the form - a sov­
ereign people choosing to establish . . .  and so on - that accords 
the relevant language-objects their identity. As Barthes puts it, 
88. See RAoUL BERGER, CoNoRESS v. THE SUPREME CouRT (1969); Robert H. Bork, 
The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 823 (1986); 
Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383 (1985); William Van 
Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of 
Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209 (1983). 
89. The point is perhaps most evident in William Van Alstyne's attempt to suggest that 
the problem of constitutional interpretation is properly focused on what he calls (with em­
phasis) "This Constitution." See Van Alstyne, supra note 88. 
90. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2; Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution 
as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984); Michelman, supra note 2; Michael J. Perry, The 
Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 551 (1985). 
91. Michelman seems to elaborate the preconditions and the implications of dialogical 
self-rule at a certain remove from the specific substantive content of the American constitu­
tional order. See Michelman, supra note 2. The argument seems to strive for great fidelity to 
the metalanguage of the constitutional myth, while paying little attention to its language­
objects. 
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"[t]he meaning is always there to present the form; the form is al­
ways there to outdistance the meaning."92 
Barthes's point is reflected in the leading works of liberal justifi­
cation. For example, the point is elegantly, even if unwittingly, ex­
emplified in the work of Ronald Dworkin, who recognizes a 
reciprocal - that is to say, circular - relation between legal inter­
pretation and its objects. Dworkin recognizes that the objects of 
legal interpretation - what he calls "the institutional materials"93 
- do not exist prior to interpretation. At the same time, Dworkin 
also recognizes that legal interpretation does not exist indepen­
dently of the materials in which it is instantiated. In Dworkin's 
work, the "institutional materials" thus play the role of the 
language-object, while his "best interpretation" plays the role of the 
metalanguage. The relation of the two is one of circularity, of re­
ciprocal constitution. We can see that a good number of liberal 
thinkers reproduce this pattern in their theories: 
Barthes Language Metalanguage � 
objects 
Dworkin Institutional Best Law as integrity 
Materials Interpretation 
Rawls Considered Theory Reflective 
Intuitions Equilibrium 
Flss Disciplining Disciplining Objectivity in 
Rules (as Rules (as form) Law 
meaning) 
It is characteristic of the liberal thinkers to promise an ultimate rec­
onciliation, a stabilization of the language-obj ect and 
metalanguage. The Rawlsian reflective equilibrium that insists that 
our considered convictions be matched up against our theory (and 
vice versa) thus promises an ever-increasing convergence of the 
two.94 Rawls promises convictions that are ever more in tune with 
theory and a theory that is ever more in tune with convictions. Sim­
ilarly, in Dworkin's work, the constant attempt of judges to make 
law the best it can be, to formulate the best interpretation that best 
explains the institutional materials, ultimately leads to a view of law 
as integrity.9s The promise is that, over time, the institutional 
92. BARTHES, supra note 1, at 123. 
93. See DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 255, 405-06. 
94. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LmERALISM, supra note 2, at 8. 
95. See DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 255, 405-06. 
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materials and the theory that best explains them will converge until, 
in the end, "law works itself pure."96 
Liberal thinkers thus exploit the possibilities of the constitu­
tional myth by recasting the language-objects of the myth in terms 
of its metalanguage and vice versa. Indeed, much of the current 
intellectual focus of liberal justification is on producing new ac­
counts that will bring about an "appropriate" relation of the 
language-objects and the metalanguage of the constitutional myth. 
Liberal thinkers thus strive to produce a new stabilized account 
of the myth. Inasmuch as they are purveyors of the myth, they al­
ways strive to provide some stabilized synthesis - some final ac­
count that must be accepted as true. 
To put it too bluntly, a great deal of "jurisprudential" theorizing 
about the meaning of the United States Constitution reduces to 
three stereotypical stances: 
(1) There are those who insist upon redefining the language­
objects of the myth in terms of the metalanguage of the myth. 
Here the paramount example might be the work of Bruce Ack­
erman, who uses the metalanguage of the constitutional myth 
to create new constitutional language-objects - to wit, higher 
lawmaking, foundational moments, a new mythic subject, 
amendment outside Article V, and so on.97 
(2) There are those who insist upon maintaining the language­
obj ects of the myth while largely disregarding its 
metalanguage. Here we would include the textualists and 
originalists, including William Van Alstyne, Robert Bork, and 
others.98 
(3) Finally, there are those who show some awareness of the 
reciprocal relation of the two aspects of the myth. Their un­
derstanding ranges from the highly sophisticated, as exempli­
fied by the work of Ronald Dworkin, to the more rudimentary, 
as manifested in the work of Owen Fiss.99 
But regardless of which of the three stances the liberal thinker as­
sumes, he or she always strives to achieve some pleasing, stabilized 
synthesis. Rather vexingly, that is precisely what cannot be had, 
because, as Barthes admonished, "[t]he meaning is always there to 
96. Ronald Dworkin, The 1984 Mccorkle Lecture: Law's Ambition for Itself, 71 VA. L. 
REv. 173, 173 (1984). 
97. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 266-69. 
98. See Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, supra note 88, at 
826; Van Alstyne, supra note 88, at 225-26, 233-35. 
99. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 2, with Fiss, supra note 46. 
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present the form; the form is always there to outdistance the mean­
ing. "100 The question of whether it is form or meaning, 
metalanguage or language-object, that should predominate remains 
necessarily unresolvable within the terms of the myth. The myth 
cannot resolve this undecidability precisely because the myth is this 
undecidability. 
To illustrate this point, recall the following scheme outlining the 
distinction between meaning and form: 
Meaning 
(Language-object) 
1787 
The Framers 
The Constitution of 1787 
Ratification 
Form 
{Metalanguage) 
Founding Moment 
The Mythic Subject 
The Paramount Norm 
Consent/Self-Rule 
It was previously suggested that such a determinate rendition was in 
some sense wrong. Now we shall see why: The undecidability of 
meaning and form in myth allows for a different allocation between 
the two. What was previously taken to be the metalanguage thus 
could very well become the language-objects of some higher order 
metalanguage, and so on. The identification of meaning and form 
within the constitutional myth might then be redescribed in the fol­
lowing terms: 
Meaning 
(Language-object) 
Founding Moment 
The Mythic Subject 
The Paramount Norm 
Consent/Self-Rule 
Form 
{Metalanguage) 
Ground 
Motivating Source 
Ultimate Authority 
Justification Principle 
The possibility of this redescription instantiates Barthes's observa­
tion that in myth, "the form always outdistances the meaning."101 
. Of significance here is that the very form of liberal justification 
already instantiates the liberal myth. The metalanguage - denoted 
as ground, motivating source, ultimate authority, and legitimation 
- is the form in which liberal justification operates. Liberal justifi­
cation, in the form of its inquiries, asks political theories to furnish 
some sort of normative justification for the political order. The 
form of liberal justification itself demands a grounds for the polit­
ical order - some action, event, happening, or occurrence. The 
100. BARTIIBS, supra note 1, at 123. 
101. Id. 
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form demands a motivating source - some notion of who or what 
creates this political order. It demands the establishment of some 
ultimate authority that is at once identifiable and determinable. It 
also demands that there be some justification principle - some rea­
son to believe that the ultimate motivating source is justified in rec­
ognizing the ultimate authority. 
Liberal justification thus institutes a form that anticipates liberal 
meaning. This is the form of normative justification. The very form 
of normative justification presupposes that reasoned argument can 
be used to persuade sovereign autonomous individuals that some 
norms can be justified and that the norms in turn justify their re­
spective political practices. It presupposes a scene (the human con­
stitution of the state), an action (deliberative argument), agents 
(sovereign and autonomous individual subjects), and instrumentali­
ties (reason) that are the essential components of the liberal world 
view. Hence, in its very formulation of the task to be performed, of 
the agents to be addressed, and of the manner of performance, the 
question of normative justification already posits and presupposes 
into existence an essentially liberal ontology, a liberal psychology, 
and a liberal narrative. 
To ask the question of normative justification is to already situ­
ate oneself within the metalanguage of the liberal myth, within the 
circles of liberal justification. It is to apprehend and experience the 
world within the mythic narratives and ontologies of liberalism. It 
is to predispose thought to reach liberal conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
What remains perhaps most interesting about liberal justifica­
tion is that it still evokes significant interest. How is this to be ex­
plained? Indeed, absent a proclivity for going around the same 
circles, what is it about liberal justification that remains appealing 
to so many thinkers? The short answer is that for those who are 
within the circles of liberal justification, the enterprise seems 
neither circular nor empty. They believe. Until one day, they 
don't. 
